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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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29 April 1966

MEGORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SULTECT: OXCART Deployment Proposal

- I. I want to invite your attention to the critical need for adequate intelligence in order to detect a possible Chinese Communist strategic buildup in South China and North Vietnam which might lead to their direct involvement in the Vietnam war. I consider foreknowledge of any Chinese factont to intervene in the Vietnam war to be so vital to the intional interest that the full collection resources available to the United States Government should be committed to the acquisition of intelligence in this connection.
- 2. The collection of intelligence to give early warning of possible Chinese Communist intervention in the Vietnam war has been assigned highest priority by the Intelligence Community. It is my conviction, shared by the United States Intelligence Board, that high resolution overhead photography is assential to obtain such intelligence. The Joint Chiefs of staff likewise are on record that every means be exploited as a matter of highest priority to obtain high resolution photographic coverage of ground force installations, major complexes, and key lines of communication in the South China and North Vietnam areas. The collection task involves adequate initial coverage and subsequent periodic coverage of meavily defended targets in North Vietnam and targets in South China. Present coverage is inadequate both as to extent and timeliness.
- 3. Currently, satellite photographic missions are being programmed to achieve the maximum coverage of key targets in South China and North Vietnam. However, because of design characteristics of the vehicle and weather conditions in the

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OXCART mission presen	From the standpoint of the ement, I would prefer to recom vehicle be committed as scon as over both South China and Notly proposing, however, immediture North Vietnam with but mi	mend to you that the as possible for operational orth Vietnam. I am ate use of OXCART princi-	
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Note: Attachment A = SNIE 10-2-66: "Reactions to Certain US Courses of Action"

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Attachment B = Briefing Book: "OXCART Deployment Proposal"